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Abstract 
This study checks the effect of foreign aid on terrorism and FDI, conditioned on domestic 
levels of corruption-control (CC). The empirical evidence is based on a sample of 78 
countries for the period 1984-2008. The following findings are established: the negative effect 
of terrorism on FDI is apparent only in higher levels of CC; foreign aid dampens the negative 
effect of terrorism on FDI only in higher levels of CC; when foreign aid is subdivided into its 
bilateral and multilateral components, the result is mixed. While our findings are in 
accordance with the stance that bilateral aid is effective in reducing the adverse impact of 
transnational terrorism, the position that only multilateral aid is effective at mitigating the 
adverse impact of domestic terrorism on FDI is not confirmed because multilateral aid also 
curbs the adverse effect of transnational terrorism on FDI. Moreover, multilateral aid also 
decreases the adverse effect of unclear and total terrorisms on FDI. Policy implications are 
discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The notion that development assistance is required to help curb the adverse effect of terrorism 
on foreign direct investment (FDI) flow to developing countries is conventionally known. 
This is following the submissions that many of the terrorism-afflicted countries are poor and 
lack vital economic resources for counterterrorism (Bandyopadhyay and Younas, 2014). This 
is even critical when considering that terrorist incidences involve threats and violence by 
some individuals or subnational groups against non-combatants, and has far-reaching effects; 
such as, increasing the risk and cost of investment, infrastructural damages, reduction in 
economic output and savings, trade losses and higher insurance premium (Singh, 2001, 2007; 
Enders, Sachsida and Sandler, 2006; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008; Keefer and Loayza, 
2008; Sandler and Enders, 2008; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas, 2014; Younas, 2015).  
Recent evidence for developing countries suggest that a standard deviation increase in 
domestic and transnational terrorism will reduce foreign investment reaching to between 296 
and 736 million US$ for a developing country with an average GDP of 70 billion US$ 
(Bandyopadhyay and Younas, 2014). The main concern with this statistic is that developing 
countries are reinventing their foreign policy to improve their attractiveness to foreign 
investment and an increase in terrorist activities will be more detrimental to their 
effort.Noting this, there is a presumption that foreign aid has a reducing effect on the impact 
of terrorism on FDI in developing countries. After all, foreign aid bolsters a developing 
country’s proactive counterterrorism effort and provides finance against transnational and 
domestic terrorism (Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas, 2014; Lee, 2015).  
In this study, we propose that this conclusion should not be taken in sacrosanct. As a 
consequence, the institutional structure (especially corruption control) in the aid recipient 
country will likely determine the extent of the government’s effort targeted towards counter-
terrorism actions. Economides, Kalyvitis and Philippopoulos (2008) provides a theoretical 
explanation in the light of the distorting effect of foreign aid on private incentives of recipient 
country’s government. Aid inflow pushes self-interested officials away from productive work 
to rent-seeking and resource extraction. The implication of this, of course, is that the extent to 
which foreign aid is effective in tackling encumbrances that confront countries is conditional 
on the prevailing level of corruption. Therefore, this paper tests this proposition using data 
from 78 developing countries (1984-2008). 
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The motivation for this study is tied to two intuitions. On the one hand, rent-seeking 
behaviour in corrupt countriesis seen as winning a ‘contestable prize’ with economic rewards 
(see Svensson, 2000; Economides, Kalyvitis and Philippopoulos, 2008); therefore, theflow of 
foreign aid to a ‘corrupt-stricken’country, with the aim of utilising it for counterterrorism 
efforts,will only increase the size of the ‘contestable prize’ andwill not achieve the purpose 
for the aid. On the other hand, foreign aid flow to a corrupt government for fighting terrorism 
will provide competing objectives for the political leader: the need to use the aid for 
counterterrorism measures in order to gratify the purpose of the aid and remain in the ‘good 
books’ of the donor. This obviously has a slim chance of being pursuedby a corrupt 
government because of the second objective (and most preferred) of using part of the aid for 
counterterrorism and the most part for financing their self-interest. Due to low accountability 
of leaders of corrupt countries (Efobi, 2014; Asongu and Kodila-Tedika, 2016), this second 
objective has the highest likelihood of being pursued. Thus, the purpose of the aid flow is 
defeated or at best, not fully accomplished.   
Unravelling this issue is relevant for the following reasons. First and principally is to promote 
aid effectiveness. Since foreign aid has been established as a tool for enhancing the 
counterterrorism measures of developing countries, there is the need for the consideration of 
the quality of institutional structures in the recipient country in order to effectively manage 
the aid for its requisite purpose. This requires empirical justification. Second, substantive 
policy conclusions that can be applicable for developing countries will be provided. Noting 
that most developing countries are challenged by prevailing corrupt leadership (Jo-Ansie, 
2007; Olken and Pande, 2011; Asongu, 2013a, b; Kim, 2013; Efobi, 2014), therefore, 
recommending ‘blanket’ foreign aid increase as a remedying tool for anti-terrorism financing 
may not be sustainable to have a lasting effect. Third, relevant empirical evidence to illustrate 
how global   efforts towards the sustenance of FDI flow to developing countries is required 
since FDI stands out as a major source of foreign capital flow for developing countries 
(Asiedu, 2006; Asiedu and Lien, 2011; Boly, Coniglio, Prota and Seric, 2015).  
This paper presents marked difference from similar studies (e.g. Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and 
Younas, 2014; Lee, 2015) based on the following innovations. Methodologically, this paper 
applies a panel system GMM estimation strategy that employs forward orthogonal deviations 
in analysing the estimable relationships. Accordingly, preference is given to the Roodman 
(2009a, b) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) because in the presence of cross-sectional 
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dependence, the use of forward orthogonal deviations produces more efficient estimates 
(Love and Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008). With regards to the focus of the paper, emphasis 
was given to the role of foreign aid in dampening the negative effect of terrorism on FDI 
contingent on domestic corruption-control levels. Emphasis was dissuaded from giving 
blanket foreign aid for themitigation of the effect of terrorism on FDI, to the conditioning of 
the extent of corruption-control (CC) levels and tailored differently across high- and low-cc 
countries. Therefore, in order to add subtlety to the policy implications, we also assess how 
‘unclear terrorism’ play-out in the investigated nexuses. The rest of the paper is organised as 
follows: data and methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in the second section. 
The third section presents the empirical analysis and discussion of the results. The fourth 
section concludes with policy implications.   
 
2. Data and Methodology
1
 
2.1 Data 
The data for this study includes 78 developing countries for the period 1984-2008. The 
sample size and period are chosen based on data availability for foreign aid and the other 
variables included in the empirical model. For instance, the institutional variable gathered 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) datasets starts from 1984. Also, following 
the approach of Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas (2014), not all developing countries 
were included in the sample as some countries that constitute an outlier to terrorist activities 
were excluded from the sample. Some of these countries include Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine 
and western Gaza.  
Considering the form of the data, it is in its non-overlapping three-year average form. There 
are reasons that explain the consideration of this form of data. The principal motivation for 
this was the need to increase the variability of the dataset across the time span. For instance, 
contemporary occurrences of terrorism reveal that they are time invariant events. This implies 
that their occurrences follow a stochastic trend and not predicated on time; therefore the 
changeability of this form of variablemay likely be low. Based on this, considering a non-
overlapping average will be suitable in ensuring a symmetric relationship between the 
variables. 
 
 
                                                          
1
This section draws heavily from the work of Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas (2014) 
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Definition of Variables  
The main explained variable is the volume of foreign direct inflow (FDI)
2
 measured as the 
percentage of the net FDI flows to GDP (FDI/GDP). The variable ‘terrorism’was categorised 
into four distinct indicators. The first is total incidence of terrorism, which is the summation 
of both the domestic, transnational and unclear terrorism. The second is the domestic 
terrorism, which includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involves the nationals of the 
venue country: implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters are all 
from the venue country. Third,is transnational terrorism including those acts of terrorism that 
concerns at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, supporters and incidence 
may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from another. Fourth, unclear 
terrorism, which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can neither be defined as domestic 
nor transnational terrorism. The terrorism data is an annual event data of terrorist activities, 
which is domiciled in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START, 2009).  
 
The data for foreign aid are from the online database of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development-OECD 
(2010). From the literature, the effect of aid on FDI is ambiguous (see Caselli and Feyrer, 
2007; Kimura and Todo, 2010; Selaya and Sunesen, 2012). We follow the positive side to the 
argument
3
that the effect of foreign aid on FDI is complementary, in the sense that foreign aid 
provides economic resources for the improvement of complimentary factors – like 
infrastructural development and human capital like education and health (see Harms and Lutz, 
2006; Asiedu, Jin and Nandwa, 2009; Kimura and Todo, 2010; Selaya and Sunesen, 2012). 
Based on this evidence, aid provides the economic resources for countries to improve the 
                                                          
2
 According to the 2013 definition by UNCTAD, FDI includes associates and subsidiaries and consist of the net 
sales of shares and loans (including non-cash acquisitions made against equipment, manufacturing rights, etc.) to 
the parent company plus the parent firm´s share of the affiliate´s reinvested earnings plus total net intra-company 
loans (short and long term provided by the parent company. For branches, FDI flows consist of the increase in 
reinvested earnings plus the net increase in funds received from the foreign direct investor. FDI flows with a 
negative sign (reverse flows) indicate that at least one of the components in the above definition is negative and 
not offset by positive amounts of the remaining components (see definition in 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI-Flows.aspx). 
 
3
The underlining reason for this choice is because recent evidences that have considered the estimable 
relationship between aid, terrorism and FDI have robustly concluded that the injection of foreign aid will provide 
available resources to the affected nation to avert the cost of terrorist activities. Since we are interested in seeing 
the effect of the institutional quality in this nexus, we prefer to follow the consensus in order to properly situate 
this study.  
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volume of infrastructural provision that may have been affected/ destroyed by terrorist 
activities. Likewise aid can provide the resources needed to improve the educational and 
health provision for developing countries and this may, reduce the rate of recruitment of some 
vulnerable proportion of the population into terrorist sects or may likely reduce the extent of 
being disgruntled by some faction of the population, which if allowed, may result to domestic 
terrorism
4
. Also, an injection of aid provides the requisite financial resources for the 
government’s counterterrorism efforts (Bandyopadhyay and Younas, 2014; Bandyopadhyay, 
Sandler and Younas, 2014; Lee, 2015).  
From the foregoing, an imperative variable that is considered is the interactive term between 
foreign aid and the different classes of terrorist acts being considered in this study. As an 
advancement in the analysis, the different components of foreign aid – i.e. multilateral and 
bilateral aid – are included in the interactive term. The reason being that the provision  of 
these types of aid are fragmented along differing motives (see Easterly, 2008). Considering 
only the aggregate aid will mask a lot of interesting divergences that stem from the behaviour 
of the disaggregated data. Like Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas (2014) observes, the 
effect of these types of aid differs because bilateral aid donors have better grip over the aid, 
therefore the recipient country will invariably use such resource for counter-terrorism effort, 
leading to improved FDI flow. This is unlike the multilateral aid donors, whose main aim for 
giving the aid is tied to development policies in the recipient country, thereby pacifying the 
grievances that might fuel terrorist activities. 
Some variables were controlled for following convention and to prevent the omitted variable 
problems that come with panel data analysis. Guidance was taken from literature (e.g. Asiedu, 
2006; Asiedu and Lien, 2011) on the factors explaining the volume of FDI flow. These 
variables include time variant variables like the GDP growth rate, trade openness, inflation 
rate and number of telephone users per 100 people.  
The justifications for the inclusion of these control variables are: GDP growth rate reflects the 
income level of the FDI host country and thus shows the extent of the return of investment for 
the foreign investors. Trade openness measures the extent to which a country’s economy is 
opened to investment and trade of the output of such investment. In essence, some forms of 
                                                          
4
See Reno (1995); Richards (1996); Bellows and Miguel (2009) on discussions about rebel forces and the 
instigating factors.  
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investment, especially those that are export oriented, are favored by an opened economy 
(Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas, 2014). Inflation rate reflects the specific 
macroeconomic shocks that are existent in the country; while the number of telephone users 
per 100 people is an indicator of the extent of infrastructural development in the country. The 
control variables have been limited to the four above because of over-identification issues. 
Accordingly, controlling for more macroeconomic factors has resulted in specifications with 
instruments higher than the number of cross sections.  
 
The last variable (modifying variable) – corruption-control, measuresthe extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
and the extent of state capture by elites and for private interests (Kauffman et al, 2010).This 
variable is not included directly in the model, but used to condition the relationship between 
foreign aid, terrorism and FDI. In essence, the relationships between the variables are tested at 
different corruption thresholds. In this study we use the median of corruption-control as the 
threshold in order to enable comparative sampled sizes. The modifying variable is obtained 
from World Governance Indicators. The impact of the modifying variable is interpreted as a 
marginal effect, consistent with Brambor (2006).  
 
Table 1 provides a clearer presentation of the variables definition and some summary 
statistics.  Some variables are defined in terms of logarithms in the table in order to enhance 
comparison. Two points are note-worthy: on the one hand, the variables are comparable based 
on their means and on the other hand, we can be confident to expect that reasonable estimated 
linkages would emerge based on the degrees of variation represented by the standard 
deviations.  
The pairwise correlation to check the bivariate association between the variables is presented 
in Table 2. This check is deemed important in order to mitigate issues of over-identification 
and multicollinearity that could substantially bias estimated results. Most importantly, this is 
reflected in the strength of association between the explanatory variables. From a preliminary 
assessment, only the terrorism and foreign aid variables are highly correlated among 
themselves respectively. 
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Table 1: Definition and Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variables Identifiers and Definitions Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
Foreign Investment 
FDI, Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows 
(% of GDP) 
 
2.494 
 
3.24 
 
-8.875 
 
26.067 
 
612 
GDP growth  GDPg, GDP growth rate (annual %) 3.852 3.467 -10.933 17.339 612 
Trade Openness  
LnTrade,Log of Exports plus Imports of 
Commodities (% of GDP) 
 
4.118 
 
0.534 
 
2.519 
 
5.546 
 
612 
Infrastructure  
LnTel,Log of Number of Telephone lines (per 
100 people) 
 
1.475 
 
1.017 
 
0.091 
 
4.031 
 
616 
Inflation  
LnInflation, Log of Consumer Price Index (% of 
annual) 
 
2.414 
 
1.384 
 
-3.434 
 
9.136 
 
581 
Bilateral Aid  
LnBilad,Log of Bilateral aid, net disbursement 
(million USD) 
 
5.181 
 
1.286 
 
0.765 
 
8.362 
 
602 
Multilateral Aid  
LnMulaid, Log of Multilateral aid, net 
disbursement (million USD) 
 
4.163 
 
1.518 
 
-1.249 
 
7.105 
 
600 
Total Aid  
LnTotaid,Log of Total aid, net disbursement 
(million USD) 
 
5.550 
 
1.276 
 
0.800 
 
8.495 
 
608 
Domestic terrorism 
Domter, Number of Domestic terrorism 
incidents 
 
14.292 
 
45.179 
 
0.000 
 
419.33 
 
624 
Transnational terrorism 
Tranater,Number of Transnational terrorism 
incidents 
 
2.316 
 
6.127 
 
0.000 
 
63.000 
 
624 
Unclear terrorism  
Unclter,Number of terrorism incidents whose 
category is unclear 
 
1.972 
 
7.479 
 
0.000 
 
86.000 
 
624 
Total terrorism  Totter,Total number of terrorism incidents  18.581 55.595 0.000 477.66 624 
Corruption _Control CC,Corruption control -0.295 0.516 -0.206 1.539 624 
Note: S.D: Standard Deviation; Min-Minimum; Max-Maximum; Obs.: Observations. 
 
Table 2: PairwiseCorrelation Matrix 
 Control Variables Foreign Aid Terrorism Dynamics   
FDI GDPg LnTrade LnTel LnInflation LnBilad LnMulaid LnTotaid Domter Tranater Unclter Totter CC  
1.000 0.193 0.430 0.263 -0.113 -0.049 0.001 -0.038 -0.118 -0.093 -0.112 -0.121 -0.011 FDI 
 1.000 0.089 0.065 -0.236 0.195 0.178 0.227 -0.058 -0.021 -0.042 -0.055 -0.004 GDPg 
  1.000 0.296 -0.230 -0.267 -0.289 -0.282 -0.236 -0.206 -0.240 -0.246 0.027 LnTrade 
   1.000 -0.121 -0.376 -0.514 -0.450 0.023 0.072 -0.003 0.026 0.269 LnTel 
    1.000 -0.047 -0.023 -0.039 0.171 0.164 0.091 0.169 -0.038 LnInflation 
     1.000 0.721 0.970 0.116 0.088 0.093 0.117 -0.172 LnBilaid 
      1.000 0.833 0.014 -0.039 0.069 0.016 -0.245 LnMulaid 
       1.000 0.093 0.059 0.094 0.094 -0.209 LnTotaid 
        1.000 0.743 0.733 0.993 0.068 Domter 
         1.000 0.528 0.785 0.052 Tranater 
          1.000 0.789 0.025 Unclter 
           1.000 0.065 Totter 
            1.000 CC 
Note: The identifiers are as earlier defined in Table 1. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
The following equations in levels (equation 1) and difference (equation 2) summarize the 
estimable model.  
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Where the time and country identifiers are represented by ‘t’ and ‘i’, respectively. From the 
model, FDIis Foreign Direct Investment; A , Foreign aid; T , Terrorism; AT , interaction 
between Foreign aid (A) and Terrorism (T); GDPg , GDP growth; Trade , Trade Openness; 
Infra, Infrastructure; Infla, Inflation; i is a country-specific effect; t  is a time-specific 
constant and;  ti ,  an error term. The two-step procedure is preferred to the one-step 
alternative in the model specification because it corrects issues of heteroscedasticity that may 
likely arise from the estimable data.  
The adopted panel System GMM estimation strategy employs forward orthogonal deviations, 
instead of first differencing. Accordingly, preference is given to the Roodman (2009a, b) 
extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) because in the presence of cross-sectional 
dependence, the use of forward orthogonal deviations produces more efficient estimates 
(Love and Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008). All the constitutive variables were included in the 
specifications. The combined significance of the constitutive termsare interpreted as marginal 
effects in order for the specifications to have economic meaning, since some range of the 
modifying variable is needed.  
3. Presentation of Empirical Results   
Tables 3, 4 and 5 present results corresponding to bilateral aid, multilateral aid and total aid 
respectively. All tables are structured in two panels. While Panel A presents results on 
domestic and transnational terrorisms, Panel B shows the findings corresponding to unclear 
and total terrorisms. The median of corruption-control is used as the threshold. Hence, three 
regressions are required for every specification to assess: the baseline effect, impact when 
corruption-control is lower or equal to the median and the effect when corruption-control is 
higher than the median. For all tables, panels and terrorism dynamics, the first set (second set) 
of specifications is without (with) control variables.  
The information criteria across panels and specifications broadly confirm the validity of the 
models. The null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR2) 
in difference is rejected for the most part. Likewise, the null hypothesis of the Sargan 
(Hansen) test for over-identification is also overwhelmingly rejected in the most part. This 
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confirms the validity of the instruments. It should be noted that while the Sargan over-
identifying restrictions (OIR) test is not robust and not weakened by instruments, the Hansen 
OIR test is robust and weakened by instruments. We have ensured that in the specifications, 
the number of instruments is lower than the number of cross-sections, to mitigate instrument 
proliferation or restrict over-identification.The Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the 
exogeneity of instruments confirms the validity of the Hansen OIR results. The Fisher tests for 
joint validity of estimated coefficients are consistently valid across specifications and panels.  
We first discuss results that are broadly consistent with all tables before engaging table-
specific outcomes. The results are broadly consistent across tables and specifications.The 
negative effect of terrorism on FDI is apparent only in the sample with higher levels of 
corruption control (CC): in the same spirit, the foreign aid flow dampens the negative effect 
of terrorism on FDI only in the sample with higher levels of CC. The result is mixed when 
foreign aid is subdivided into bilateral and multilateral aid. While our findings are in 
accordance with the stance that bilateral aid is effective in reducing the adverse impact of 
transnational terrorism (see Right Hand Side (RHS) of Panel A in Table 3), the position that 
only multilateral aid is effective in mitigating the adverse impact of domestic terrorism on 
FDI is not confirmed because multilateral aid also curbs the adverse effect of transnational 
terrorism on FDI (see RHS of Panel A in Table 4). This finding agrees with Bandyopadhyay, 
Sandler and Younas (2014) in some form. Multilateral aid also decreases the adverse effect of 
unclear and total terrorisms on FDI (see Panel B of Table 4). It is interesting to note that, the 
comparative exercises between the present exposition and the underlying study is only valid 
for the sub-sample in which CC levels are high (or above the median). 
In what follows, the tables are discussed in terms of signs and magnitude of estimated 
coefficients, marginal effects, convergence patterns and control variables. The positive effect 
of domestic terrorism on FDI is higher when CC levels are low in specifications without 
control variables. This tendency is broadly consistent with unclear and total terrorisms in 
Panel B. The threshold point at which the modifying variable or ‘bilateral aid’ mitigates the 
adverse effect of transnational terrorism is within range. Accordingly: 6.666 (0.140/0.021) is 
within the maximum range of 8.362 disclosed in the summary statistics. There is also an 
overwhelming evidence of convergence across specifications and panels. The maximum rate 
of convergence is 27.06% per annum: pa (0.812/3) while the minimum rate is 18.46% pa 
(0.554/3). (ii) With the exceptions of first specifications without control variables for 
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domestic, transnational and total terrorisms, the convergence rate is slightly slower in 
countries with higher CC levels. It is important to note that the information criterion for the 
establishment of significance is when the absolute value of the lagged endogenous variable is 
situated between 0 and 1.  
In the computation of the convergence rate, the lagged value is divided by three because we 
have used 3 year non-overlapping intervals to mitigate short-run or business cycle 
disturbances. The interested reader can find more information on the computation of 
convergence rates (in presence of data averages) in recent convergence literature, notably: 
Asongu (2013c) and Asongu (2014b). Most of the significant control variables have the 
expected signs. While trade openness and GDP growth intuitively increase FDI, low and 
stable inflation are significant positive booststo FDI location decisions. It should be noted that 
the mean of inflation is 2.414.  
 
Table 3: FDI, Bilateral aid, Terrorism and Corruption-Control 
 Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows    
 Panel A: Domestic and Transnational Terrorisms  
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
 CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M 
 
Constant 
0.905 
(0.384) 
-0.709 
(0.570) 
4.070*** 
(0.000) 
-2.840 
(0.338) 
6.469 
(0.147) 
-5.76*** 
(0.003) 
0.382 
(0.640) 
2.040* 
(0.074) 
2.123* 
(0.085) 
-5.580 
(0.039) 
5.476* 
(0.094) 
-7.05*** 
(0.001) 
 
FDI(-1) 
0.812*** 
(0.000) 
0.613*** 
(0.000) 
0.670*** 
(0.000) 
0.681*** 
(0.000) 
0.582*** 
(0.000) 
0.554*** 
(0.000) 
0.670*** 
(0.000) 
0.651*** 
(0.000) 
0.676*** 
(0.000) 
0.652*** 
(0.000) 
0.595*** 
(0.000) 
0.574*** 
(0.000) 
 
Domter 
0.022** 
(0.017) 
0.405** 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.373) 
0.029*** 
(0.000) 
0.252* 
(0.096) 
-0.004 
(0.353) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Tranater 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.024 
(0.583) 
0.146 
(0.443) 
-0.086 
(0.124) 
0.052 
(0.278) 
0.021 
(0.887) 
-0.140** 
(0.017) 
 
LnBilaid 
0.169 
(0.318) 
0.358 
(0.170) 
-0.141 
(0.451) 
0.337** 
(0.031) 
0.148 
(0.514) 
0.236* 
(0.096) 
0.031 
(0.842) 
-0.029 
(0.881) 
-0.174 
(0.396) 
0.200 
(0.191) 
-0.134 
(0.468) 
0.221 
(0.188) 
 
Domter× LnBilaid 
-0.004** 
(0.011) 
-0.077** 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.510) 
-0.005*** 
(0.088) 
-0.048 
(0.109) 
0.001 
(0.557) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
Tranater× LnBilaid 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
-- 
-0.004 
(0.599) 
-0.025 
(0.472) 
0.013 
(0.172) 
-0.009 
(0.349) 
-0.003 
(0.917) 
0.021** 
(0.035) 
 
GDP growth 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.046 
(0.229) 
0.001 
(0.993) 
0.009 
(0.809) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.052 
(0.118) 
0.001 
(0.972) 
0.016 
(0.562) 
 
LnTrade 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.600 
(0.336) 
-1.264 
(0.231) 
1.889*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
1.188* 
(0.051) 
-0.881 
(0.209) 
2.144*** 
(0.000) 
 
LnInflation 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.241* 
(0.050) 
0.123 
(0.422) 
-0.041 
(0.697) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.212 
(0.079) 
0.254** 
(0.019) 
-0.026 
(0.797) 
 
LnInfrastructure 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.084 
(0.539) 
0.249 
(0.279) 
0.024 
(0.838) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.278 
(0.088) 
0.177 
(0.290) 
0.014 
(0.943) 
             
AR(1) (0.001) (0.010) (0.011) (0.002) (0.026) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) 
AR(2) (0.422) (0.304) (0.355) (0.508) (0.235) (0.388) (0.403) (0.593) (0.414) (0.525) (0.471) (0.429) 
Sargan OIR (0.053) (0.533) (0.652) (0.007) (0.392) (0.103) (0.024) (0.044) (0.530) (0.001) (0.000) (0.086) 
Hansen OIR (0.214) (0.834) (0.736) (0.232) (0.875) (0.434) (0.271) (0.446) (0.622) (0.384) (0.477) (0.492) 
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.494) (0.628) (0.561) (0.612) (0.923) (0.252) (0.524) (0.405) (0.878) (0.443) (0.585) (0.470) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.149) (0.776) (0.680) (0.134) (0.668) (0.569) (0.190) (0.426) (0.390) (0.352) (0.376) (0.462) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.342) (0.578) (0.903) (0.260) (0.932) (0.586) (0.070) (0.167) (0.692) (0.240) (0.390) (0.483) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.193) (0.904) (0.441) (0.293) (0.320) (0.219) (0.739) (0.935) (0.443) (0.711) (0.611) (0.437) 
Fisher  71.51*** 22.55*** 111.9*** 33.60*** 22.28*** 160.7*** 51.50*** 25.80*** 35.39*** 24.18*** 27.78*** 34.93*** 
Instruments  21 19 21 37 35 37 21 19 21 37 35 37 
Countries  78 68 75 77 67 72 78 68 75 77 67 72 
Observations  514 300 214 483 284 199 514 300 214 483 284 199 
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Panel B: Unclear and Total Terrorisms 
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
 CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M 
 
Constant 
0.438 
(0.651) 
1.340 
(0.117) 
3.207** 
(0.040) 
-2.764 
(0.218) 
2.847 
(0.207) 
-7.21*** 
(0.001) 
0.748 
(0.476) 
0.727 
(0.535) 
2.099* 
(0.074) 
-3.849 
(0.160) 
5.115 
(0.190) 
-7.21*** 
(0.000) 
 
FDI(-1) 
0.726*** 
(0.000) 
0.746*** 
(0.000) 
0.710*** 
(0.000) 
0.668*** 
(0.000) 
0.626*** 
(0.000) 
0.602*** 
(0.000) 
0.786*** 
(0.000) 
0.663*** 
(0.000) 
0.675*** 
(0.000) 
0.673*** 
(0.000) 
0.602*** 
(0.000) 
0.561*** 
(0.000) 
 
Unclter  
0.042 
(0.363) 
0.157** 
(0.027) 
-0.054 
(0.270) 
0.036 
(0.521) 
0.059 
(0.257) 
-0.040 
(0.225) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Totter 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.017** 
(0.018) 
0.152** 
(0.042) 
-0.006 
(0.267) 
0.019*** 
(0.000) 
0.116 
(0.194) 
-0.005 
(0.213) 
 
LnBilaid 
0.255* 
(0.078) 
0.087 
(0.574) 
0.016 
(0.914) 
0.239 
(0.126) 
-0.057 
(0.704) 
0.365** 
(0.012) 
0.211 
(0.224) 
0.245 
(0.300) 
-0.149 
(0.417) 
0.334** 
(0.033) 
0.179 
(0.380) 
0.226 
(0.112) 
 
Unclter × LnBilaid 
-0.009 
(0.281) 
-0.029** 
(0.018) 
0.008 
(0.309) 
-0.007 
(0.470) 
-0.013 
(0.150) 
0.008 
(0.176) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Totter× LnBilaid 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.003** 
(0.014) 
-0.028** 
(0.047) 
0.001 
(0.409) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.021 
(0.211) 
0.001 
(0.344) 
 
GDP growth 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.066* 
(0.072) 
-0.001 
(0.993) 
0.012 
(0.749) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.058 
(0.123) 
-0.006 
(0.905) 
0.012 
(0.739) 
 
LnTrade 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.301 
(0.493) 
-0.282 
(0.508) 
1.672*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.484 
(0.457) 
-1.002 
(0.260) 
1.920*** 
(0.000) 
 
LnInflation 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.313*** 
(0.006) 
0.210* 
(0.084) 
-0.017 
(0.864) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.263** 
(0.036) 
0.072 
(0.584) 
-0.034 
(0.749) 
 
LnInfrastructure 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.106 
(0.430) 
0.134 
(0.338) 
0.202 
(0.153) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.092 
(0.519) 
0.234 
(0.281) 
0.031 
(0.798) 
AR(1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) 
AR(2) (0.433) (0.730) (0.321) (0.551) (0.502) (0.387) (0.415) (0.449) (0.364) (0.527) (0.333) (0.399) 
Sargan OIR (0.070) (0.102) (0.600) (0.005) (0.000) (0.067) (0.051) (0.300) (0.642) (0.006) (0.128) (0.098) 
Hansen OIR (0.901) (0.356) (0.802) (0.447) (0.590) (0.473) (0.165) (0.873 (0.726) (0.218) (0.882) (0.455) 
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.692) (0.507) (0.650) (0.538) (0.737) (0.201) (0.549) (0.615) (0.898) (0.619) (0.908) (0.267) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.847) (0.276) (0.720) (0.368) (0.415) (0.679) (0.099) (0.839) (0.494) (0.122) (0.696) (0.580) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.641) (0.769) (0.755) (0.465) (0.813) (0.597) (0.170) (0.590) (0.943) (0.225) (0.950) (0.592) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.887) (0.103) (0.642) (0.381) (0.123) (0.257) (0.257) (0.961) (0.398) (0.329) (0.274) (0.239) 
             
Fisher  101.6*** 46.10*** 74.38*** 34.85*** 56.04*** 35.64*** 68.89*** 27.43*** 103.7*** 32.73*** 28.08*** 102.8*** 
Instruments  21 19 41 37 35 37 21 19 21 37 35 37 
Countries  78 68 75 77 67 72 78 68 75 72 67 72 
Observations  514 300 214 483 284 199 514 300 214 483 284 199 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Bilaid: Bilateral aid.  CC: Corruption-Control. M: Median of Corruption-
Control (-0.1009844). DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying 
Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher 
statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
 
The following can be established for Table 4: like in Table 3, the positive effect of domestic 
terrorism on FDI is higher when CC levels are low; especially in specifications without 
control variables. This tendency is broadly consistent with unclear and total terrorisms in 
Panel B respectively for specifications with and without control variables. Threshold points at 
which multilateral aid mitigates the adverse effects of terrorism are broadly within range, with 
the slight exception of domestic terrorism. 
Focusing on domestic terrorism, it is 8 (0.008/0.001) and not within range because the 
maximum in the range is 7.105. With respect to transnational terrorism, 7.1 (0.071/0.010) is 
just within the limits of the maximum range (or 7.105). For unclear terrorism, 4.73 (0.71/0.15) 
is within range and 7 (0.007/0.001) is also within range for total terrorism.  
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Regarding evidences of convergence, we can establish the following: The maximum rate of 
convergence is 27.36% (0.821/3) pa while the minimum rate is 16.76% pa (0.503/3). This is 
only applicable with the exceptions of first specifications without control variables for 
domestic, unclear and total terrorisms.The convergence rate is slightly slower in countries 
with higher CC levels. Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs.  
In addition to the explanations provided for the effects of GDP growth and trade openness 
already discussed above, two more interesting new patterns are worth discussing. First, trade 
openness and GDP growth have negative (positive) effects in the sub-sample with low (high) 
CC levels. This is consistent with intuition and the predictions of economic theory. 
Accordingly, the presence of low levels of corruption-control could potentially dissuade FDI 
even in the presence of burgeoning economic growth and trade (Musila and Sigué, 2007, 
2010). Second, there is a slight exception of infrastructure having a negative effect of FDI in 
the left hand side (LHS) of Panel B. The argument for this effect is not very strong because it 
is significant at the 10% level. However, a possible explanation may be the use of mobile 
phone applications for activities that discourage FDI in the sub-sample with high CC levels. 
This interpretation should be treated with caution because the argument is not consistently 
significant across samples and panels.  
Table 4: FDI, Multilateral aid, Terrorism and Corruption-Control 
 Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows    
 Panel A: Domestic and Transnational Terrorisms  
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
 CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M 
 
Constant 
-0.161 
(0.800) 
-1.567* 
(0.099) 
1.184* 
(0.092) 
-5.061* 
(0.094) 
0.916 
(0.678) 
-2.043 
(0.400) 
-0.065 
(0.934) 
-0.955 
(0.292) 
4.764*** 
(0.000) 
-4.189 
(0.131) 
2.858 
(0.218) 
-1.557 
(0.557) 
 
FDI(-1) 
0.820*** 
(0.000) 
0.651*** 
(0.000) 
0.779*** 
(0.000) 
0.722*** 
(0.000) 
0.658*** 
(0.000) 
0.581*** 
(0.000) 
0.766*** 
(0.000) 
0.738*** 
(0.000) 
0.608*** 
(0.000) 
0.733*** 
(0.000) 
0.630*** 
(0.000) 
0.503*** 
(0.000) 
 
Domter 
0.006*** 
(0.000) 
0.034** 
(0.031) 
-0.003 
(0.197) 
0.005** 
(0.048) 
0.014 
(0.289) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Tranater 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.031 
(0.120) 
0.091 
(0.159) 
-0.035** 
(0.020) 
0.042** 
(0.031) 
0.082 
(0.228) 
-0.071*** 
(0.000) 
 
LnMulaid 
0.180 
(0.248) 
0.599*** 
(0.006) 
-0.157 
(0.203) 
0.249* 
(0.051) 
0.442** 
(0.027) 
-0.185 
(0.240) 
0.176 
(0.247) 
0.371 
(0.080) 
-0.184 
(0.284) 
0.212* 
(0.068) 
0.543** 
(0.024) 
-0.226 
(0.106) 
 
Domter× LnMulaid 
-0.001** 
(0.017) 
-0.007 
(0.189) 
0.001 
(0.409) 
-0.001* 
(0.083) 
-0.004 
(0.337) 
0.001*** 
(0.003) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Tranater× LnMulaid 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.007 
(0.250) 
-0.013 
(0.544) 
0.004 
(0.313) 
-0.008 
(0.188) 
-0.027 
(0.309) 
0.010** 
(0.014) 
 
GDP growth 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.044 
(0.227) 
-0.080* 
(0.056) 
0.066* 
(0.055) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.036 
(0.333) 
-0.071 
(0.120) 
0.039 
(0.160) 
 
LnTrade 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
1.250* 
(0.065) 
-0.601 
(0.209) 
1.566*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
1.086* 
(0.064) 
-1.173** 
(0.033) 
1.508*** 
(0.005) 
 
LnInflation 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.249* 
(0.049) 
0.193 
(0.133) 
0.046 
(0.665) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.229* 
(0.053) 
0.293** 
(0.020) 
0.002 
(0.983) 
 
LnInfrastructure 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.122 
(0.501) 
0.148 
(0.405) 
-0.354 
(0.142) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.116 
(0.507) 
0.252 
(0.166) 
-0.324 
(0.170) 
AR(1) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.000) (0.002) (0.014) (0.001) (0.004) (0.016) 
AR(2) (0.463) (0.626) (0.320) (0.462) (0.393) (0.417) (0.438) (0.591) (0.237) (0.448) (0.370) (0.347) 
Sargan OIR (0.529) (0.639) (0.574) (0.009) (0.045) (0.032) (0.346) (0.659) (0.554) (0.003) (0.036) (0.038) 
Hansen OIR (0.473) (0.837) (0.660) (0.195) (0.623) (0.366) (0.505) (0.684) (0.323) (0.194) (0.639) (0.185) 
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
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H excluding group (0.698) (0.367) (0.697) (0.251) (0.549) (0.373) (0.673) (0.473) (0.679) (0.226) (0.464) (0.620) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.315) (0.921) (0.511) (0.241) (0.569) (0.376) (0.355) (0.669) (0.192) (0.258) (0.646) (0.098) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.819) (0.496) (0.931) (0.072) (0.828) (0.199) (0.585) (0.372) (0.317) (0.106) (0.605) (0.177) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.231) (0.986) (0.337) (0.859) (0.137) (0.788) (0.375) (0.915) (0.346) (0.651) (0.512) (0.351) 
             
Fisher  40.12*** 33.66*** 83.52*** 57.80*** 34.80*** 168.7*** 32.37*** 35.28*** 41.07*** 33.46*** 32.10*** 47.18*** 
Instruments  21 19 21 37 35 37 21 19 21 37 35 37 
Countries  78 68 75 77 67 71 78 68 75 77 67 71 
Observations  515 305 210 482 287 195 515 305 210 482 287 195 
 Panel B: Unclear and Total Terrorisms 
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
 CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M 
 
Constant 
1.027 
(0.227) 
-1.366 
(0.113) 
3.734*** 
(0.000) 
-5.236** 
(0.038) 
-1.140 
(0.601) 
-2.512 
(0.253) 
0.874 
(0.351) 
-1.773* 
(0.074) 
3.971*** 
(0.000) 
-5.868** 
(0.021) 
0.926 
(0.641) 
-2.403 
(0.332) 
 
FDI(-1) 
0.761*** 
(0.000) 
0.702*** 
(0.000) 
0.739*** 
(0.000) 
0.714*** 
(0.000) 
0.661*** 
(0.000) 
0.586*** 
(0.000) 
0.821*** 
(0.000) 
0.671*** 
(0.000) 
0.776*** 
(0.000) 
0.728*** 
(0.000) 
0.651*** 
(0.000) 
0.586*** 
(0.000) 
 
Unclter  
0.018 
(0.206) 
0.052*** 
(0.000) 
-0.031 
(0.102) 
0.032** 
(0.028) 
0.013 
(0.237) 
-0.071*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Totter 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.004*** 
(0.008) 
0.023*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.164) 
0.004** 
(0.035) 
0.012* 
(0.063) 
-0.007*** 
(0.000) 
 
LnMulaid 
0.224 
(0.157) 
0.516*** 
(0.008) 
-0.074 
(0.567) 
0.272** 
(0.025) 
0.501*** 
(0.004) 
-0.260 
(0.133) 
0.178 
(0.274) 
0.644*** 
(0.004) 
-0.151 
(0.191) 
0.234* 
(0.066) 
0.510** 
(0.011) 
-0.197 
(0.222) 
 
Unclter × LnMulaid 
-0.004 
(0.104) 
-0.009*** 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.123) 
-0.005** 
(0.030) 
-0.004*** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Totter× LnMulaid 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.001** 
(0.024) 
-0.004*** 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.378) 
-0.001 
(0.111) 
-0.004 
(0.111) 
0.001*** 
(0.001) 
 
GDP growth 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.047 
(0.260) 
-0.090** 
(0.046) 
0.048 
(0.145) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.040 
(0.290) 
-0.074 
(0.082) 
0.067** 
(0.045) 
 
LnTrade 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
1.234** 
(0.012) 
0.163 
(0.736) 
1.809*** 
(0.001) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
1.214* 
(0.062) 
-0.712* 
(0.063) 
1.686*** 
(0.000) 
 
LnInflation 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.252** 
(0.025) 
0.224* 
(0.080) 
0.010 
(0.921) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.235* 
(0.060) 
0.234* 
(0.068) 
0.038 
(0.728) 
 
LnInfrastructure 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.069 
(0.681) 
0.109 
(0.491) 
-0.508* 
(0.078) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.136 
(0.446) 
0.186 
(0.282) 
-0.417 
(0.103) 
AR(1) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
AR(2) (0.439) (0.599) (0.246) (0.453) (0.311) (0.355) (0.460) (0.618) (0.322) (0.458) (0.003) (0.417) 
Sargan OIR (0.627) (0.397) (0.606) (0.011) (0.015) (0.028) (0.508) (0.620) (0.570) (0.007) (0.033) (0.033) 
Hansen OIR (0.654) (0.638) (0.657) (0.255) (0.437) (0.241) (0.429) (0.801) (0.652) (0.205) (0.622) (0.393) 
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.705) (0.340) (0.929) (0.276) (0.569) (0.480) (0.669) (0.371) (0.781) (0.235) (0.571) (0.392) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.501) (0.715) (0.402) (0.306) (0.341) (0.183) (0.284) (0.882) (0.463) (0.267) (0.553) (0.396) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.561) (0.495) (0.682) (0.245) (0.733) (0.205) (0.884) (0.484) (0.864) (0.074) (0.770) (0.225) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.575) (0.641) (0.491) (0.376) (0.077) (0.434) (0.175) (0.954) (0.371) (0.878) (0.197) (0.777) 
Fisher  78.52*** 58.45*** 86.59*** 73.03*** 60.62*** 124.4*** 39.84*** 35.96*** 54.35*** 54.61*** 38.41*** 98.47*** 
Instruments  21 19 21 37 35 37 21 19 21 37 35 37 
Countries  78 68 75 77 67 75 78 68 75 77 67 71 
Observations  515 305 210 482 287 195 515 305 210 482 287 195 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Mulaid: Multilateral aid.  CC: Corruption-Control. M: Median of Corruption-
Control (-0.1009844). DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying 
Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher 
statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
 
From the Table 6 on total aid, the positive effect of terrorism is higher in the sub-sample with 
low CC levels, which is consistent with evidence from the preceding tables. While this is the 
case only in specifications without control variables for unclear terrorism; extended to 
specifications with control variables for domestic and total terrorisms, it is not the case in 
either specification for transnational terrorism. With the exception of‘domestic terrorism’ for 
which total aid does not mitigate its adverse effect on FDI, threshold points at which total aid 
reduces the negativeimpacts of terrorism are broadly within range.For transnational terrorism, 
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it is 6.60 (0.152/0.023) which is within the range of between 0.800 and 8.495, while for 
unclear terrorism, 6 (0.072/0.012) is also within range and 8 (0.008/0.001) is within range for 
total terrorism. 
With regards to the evidence of convergence, the following are observable from the Table 5: 
the maximum rate of convergence is 28.33% (0.850/3) pa while the minimum rate is 18.46% 
pa (0.554/3).This is with the exceptions of first specifications without control variables for all 
dynamics of terrorism; the convergence rate is slightly slower in countries with higher 
CClevels. Fourth, the discussion relevant to the signs of the significant control variables is 
consistent with those pertaining to Table 3 and Table 4 on bilateral and multilateral aid 
respectively.  
Table 5: FDI, Total Aid, Terrorism and Corruption-Control 
 Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows    
 Panel A: Domestic and Transnational Terrorisms  
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
 CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M 
 
Constant 
-0.085 
(0.948) 
-0.270 
(0.848) 
2.172 
(0.171) 
-3.329 
(0.295) 
3.923 
(0.187) 
-6.540*** 
(0.000) 
1.138 
(0.363) 
-0.076 
(0.948) 
3.431** 
(0.032) 
-4.903 
(0.140) 
4.622 
(0.110) 
-6.530*** 
(0.006) 
 
FDI(-1) 
0.850*** 
(0.000) 
0.599*** 
(0.000) 
0.785*** 
(0.000) 
0.690*** 
(0.000) 
0.610*** 
(0.000) 
0.554*** 
(0.000) 
0.673*** 
(0.000) 
0.629*** 
(0.000) 
0.696*** 
(0.000) 
0.676*** 
(0.000) 
0.603*** 
(0.000) 
0.579*** 
(0.000) 
 
Domter 
0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.166** 
(0.018) 
-0.004 
(0.589) 
0.027*** 
(0.001) 
0.193*** 
(0.005) 
-0.008* 
(0.059) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Tranater 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.038 
(0.419) 
0.118 
(0.519) 
-0.119** 
(0.019) 
0.051 
(0.260) 
0.042 
(0.792) 
-0.152*** 
(0.001) 
 
LnTotaid 
0.314 
(0.112) 
0.180 
(0.462) 
-0.156 
(0.507) 
0.407*** 
(0.009) 
0.256 
(0.214) 
0.201 
(0.230) 
0.167 
(0.402) 
0.121 
(0.570) 
-0.392* 
(0.087) 
0.335** 
(0.039) 
0.025 
(0.911) 
0.096 
(0.589) 
 
Domter× LnTotaid 
-0.004*** 
(0.004) 
-0.029** 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.705) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.035*** 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.120) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Tranater× LnTotaid 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.008 
(0.379) 
-0.018 
(0.595) 
0.019** 
(0.036) 
-0.010 
(0.257) 
-0.007 
(0.810) 
0.023*** 
(0.002) 
 
GDP growth 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.048 
(0.210) 
-0.012 
(0.747) 
0.015 
(0.685) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.040 
(0.235) 
-0.014 
(0.713) 
0.036 
(0.197) 
 
LnTrade 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.579 
(0.378) 
-0.850 
(0.218) 
2.054*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
1.107 
(0.104) 
-1.060* 
(0.070) 
2.173*** 
(0.000) 
 
LnInflation 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.177 
(0.149) 
0.096 
(0.485) 
-0.059 
(0.571) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.153 
(0.225) 
0.184 
(0.104) 
-0.025 
(0.808) 
 
LnInfrastructure 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.011 
(0.940) 
0.150 
(0.305) 
0.038 
(0.800) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.155 
(0.370) 
0.154 
(0.268) 
-0.054 
(0.777) 
AR(1) (0.001) (0.005) (0.013) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) 
AR(2) (0.429) (0.426) (0.332) (0.542) (0.234) (0.399) (0.414) (0.693) (0.334) (0.559) (0.522) (0.425) 
Sargan OIR (0.071) (0.429) (0.221) (0.004) (0.072) (0.041) (0.025) (0.178) (0.155) (0.001) (0.001) (0.031) 
Hansen OIR (0.253) (0.467) (0.670) (0.343) (0.675) (0.410) (0.143) (0.267) (0.442) (0.246) (0.377) (0.443) 
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.792) (0.707) (0.497) (0.638) (0.919) (0.255) (0.740) (0.479) (0.903) (0.473) (0.681) (0.569) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.199) (0.306) (0.636) (0.218) (0.388) (0.534) (0.062) (0.201) (0.225) (0.190) (0.232) (0.348) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.285) (0.208) (0.880) (0.336) (0.796) (0.430) (0.056) (0.160) (0.496) (0.117) (0.453) (0.288) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.278) (0.865) (0.381) (0.391) (0.233) (0.367)  (0.483) (0.556) (0.360) (0.778) (0.249) (0.725) 
Fisher  96.26*** 30.91*** 132.0*** 43.48*** 38.31*** 163.4*** 55.28*** 28.23*** 44.91*** 32.56*** 27.13*** 41.8*** 
Instruments  21 19 21 37 35 37 21 19 21 37 35 37 
Countries  78 68 75 77 67 72 78 68 75 77 67 72 
Observations  520 306 214 487 288 199 520 306 214 487 288 199 
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Panel B: Unclear and Total Terrorisms 
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
 CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M 
 
Constant 
-0.184 
(0.866) 
0.958 
(0.327) 
1.409 
(0.361) 
-4.271** 
(0.046) 
1.578 
(0.484) 
-6.77*** 
(0.003) 
-0.235 
(0.859) 
0.955 
(0.499) 
2.152 
(0.181) 
-4.473 
(0.122) 
3.779 
(0.158) 
-6.65*** 
(0.003) 
 
FDI(-1) 
0.747*** 
(0.000) 
0.746*** 
(0.000) 
0.750*** 
(0.000) 
0.694*** 
(0.000) 
0.655*** 
(0.000) 
0.597*** 
(0.000) 
0.821** 
(0.000) 
0.617*** 
(0.000) 
0.780*** 
(0.000) 
0.687*** 
(0.000) 
0.618*** 
(0.000) 
0.560*** 
(0.000) 
 
Unclter  
0.045 
(0.133) 
0.063* 
(0.086) 
-0.054 
(0.225) 
0.059 
(0.131) 
0.009 
(0.738) 
-0.072** 
(0.050) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Totter 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.019*** 
(0.005) 
0.067** 
(0.028) 
-0.004 
(0.477) 
0.017*** 
(0.000) 
0.093*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.024) 
 
LnTotaid 
0.349** 
(0.028) 
0.149 
(0.387) 
0.001 
(0.995) 
0.286* 
(0.056) 
0.079 
(0.655) 
0.260 
(0.152) 
0.351* 
(0.083) 
0.223 
(0.329) 
-0.164 
(0.500) 
0.393** 
(0.014) 
0.260 
(0.211) 
0.190 
(0.257) 
 
Unclter × LnTotaid 
-0.008* 
(0.089) 
-0.011 
(0.034) 
0.008 
(0.261) 
-0.009 
(0.133) 
-0.003 
(0.346) 
0.012** 
(0.042) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Totter× LnTotaid 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.003*** 
(0.006) 
-0.011** 
(0.041) 
0.001 
(0.608) 
-0.003*** 
(0.009) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.001* 
(0.056) 
 
GDP growth 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.068* 
(0.081) 
-0.029 
(0.479) 
0.029 
(0.469) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.054 
(0.159) 
-0.023 
(0.539) 
0.017 
(0.637) 
 
LnTrade 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.605 
(0.130) 
-0.047 
(0.898) 
1.843*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.550 
(0.403) 
-0.796 
(0.162) 
2.084*** 
(0.000) 
 
LnInflation 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.252** 
(0.025) 
0.156 
(0.200) 
-0.004 
(0.965) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.191 
(0.123) 
0.075 
(0.545) 
-0.052 
(0.617) 
 
LnInfrastructure 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.044 
(0.777) 
-0.031 
(0.802) 
0.162 
(0.363) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.029 
(0.855) 
0.106 
(0.433) 
0.044 
(0.766) 
AR(1) (0.001) (0.730) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.013) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) 
AR(2) (0.439) (0.730) (0.297) (0.575) (0.510) (0.398) (0.430) (0.474) (0.337) (0.553) (0.339) (0.408) 
Sargan OIR (0.066) (0.193) (0.177) (0.002) (0.001) (0.026) (0.067) (0.216) (0.216) (0.004) (0.006) (0.039) 
Hansen OIR (0.700) (0.647) (0.755) (0.437) (0.473) (0.417) (0.198) (0.266) (0.660) (0.316) (0.462) (0.426) 
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.929) (0.457) (0.677) (0.466) (0.636) (0.222) (0.849) (0.592) (0.823) (0.644) (0.791) (0.276) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.448) (0.634) (0.640) (0.400) (0.344) (0.580) (0.080) (0.168) (0.453) (0.192) (0.259) (0.534) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.592) (0.675) (0.475) (0.514) (0.933) (0.300) (0.168) (0.172) (0.957) (0.313) (0.544) (0.447) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.613) (0.434) (0.787) (0.298) (0.019) (0.634) (0.317) (0.515) (0.319) (0.377) (0.261) (0.370) 
Fisher  100.4*** 53.82*** 101.8*** 44.04*** 67.67*** 42.86*** 81.02*** 28.84*** 138.8*** 39.78*** 43.57*** 123.0*** 
Instruments  21 19 21 37 35 37 21 19 21 37 35 37 
Countries  78 68 75 77 67 72 78 68 75 77 67 72 
Observations  520 306 214 487 288 199 520 306 214 487 288 199 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Totaid: Total aid.  CC: Corruption-Control. M: Median of Corruption-Control 
(-0.1009844). DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions 
Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR (1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the 
Sargan OIR test. 
 
4. Concluding implications 
We set-out to extend Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas (2014) by conditioning the 
mitigation effect of foreign aid on corruption-control (CC) levels. We briefly highlight the 
findings of our study. The negative effect of terrorism on FDI is apparent only in higher levels 
of CC. Foreign aid dampens the negative effect of terrorism on FDI only in higher levels of 
CC.The result is mixed when aid is subdivided into its bilateral and multilateralcomponent. 
While our findings are in accordance with the stance that bilateral aid is effective in reducing 
the adverse impact of transnational terrorism, the position that only multilateral aid is 
effective at mitigating the adverse impact of domestic terrorism on FDI is not confirmed 
because multilateral aid also curbs the adverse effect of transnational terrorism on FDI. 
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Moreover, multilateral aid also decreases the adverse effect of unclear and total terrorisms on 
FDI. 
On a specific count, we have also noticed the following across dynamics of bilateral aid, 
multilateral aid and total aid. First, some terrorism dynamics may not deter FDI location 
decisions especially in countries experiencing low levels of institutional governance in terms 
of CC. This implies that the prevailing institutional structure may matter more for FDI despite 
the incidence of terrorism and this is likely tied to the confidence of FDI in the government’s 
ability to protect their interest as well as defeat the prevailing encumbrance.    
We have observed that the threshold point at which the modifying foreign aid variables are 
within their respective ranges, with the slight exception of multilateral aid, decreases the 
adverse effect of domestic terrorism. A resulting policy implication is that more multilateral 
aid may be needed to combat the negative effect of domestic terrorism on FDI in countries 
with CC levels that are above the median. The employment of this range is important in order 
to provide economic significance to interactive estimated coefficients since overall 
interpretations are based on marginal effects. Moreover, given that most of the thresholds are 
just close to the upper limit or maximum of the range, it implies that more development 
assistance is needed to reap more benefits from the mitigating role of foreign aid. It should be 
noted that the closeness of the threshold to the upper limit implies that only a few sampled 
countries enjoy the dampening role of foreign aid in the effect of terrorism dynamics on FDI. 
Hence, more foreign aid is required to make these benefits more accessible.  
The rate of convergence is between 18.46% and 27.06%, 16.76% and 27.36%, and 18.46% 
and 28.33% per annum in specifications with bilateral aid, multilateral aid and total aid 
respectively. This implies that corresponding time to full convergence is respectively between 
16.25 years (yrs) (300%/18.46%)and11.08 yrs (300%/27.06%),  17.89 yrs (300%/16.76%) 
and 10.96 yrs (300%/27.36%),  16.25 yrs (300%/18.46%) and 10.58 (300%/28.33%). The 
interested reader can find more insights into the computations of full convergence in Asongu 
(2013c, 2014b).  
We have also broadly established that, with the exception of first specifications which do not 
include control variables, the rate of convergence is slightly lower in countries with higher 
corruption-control levels. This suggests, that the presence of more variables in the 
conditioning information set leads to a lower degree of catch-up among countries with higher 
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levels of CC. In other words, changes in cross-country institutional and structural differences 
on which conditional convergence is based are less apparent in the presence of more control 
variables for high CC countries. This interpretation should be treated with caution because 
conditional convergence is contingent on the variables we choose and empirically test, which 
may not necessarily reflect all cross-country institutional and structural difference needed for 
conditional convergence to occur.  
In this study, we have conditioned the analysis only on one dimension of institutional 
governance (i.e. corruption control). This leaves much room for future lines of inquiry which 
could be positioned on how the conditionality of other governance dynamics affects the 
investigated nexuses.  
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